ABSTRACT Secure and efficient lightweight user authentication protocol for mobile cloud computing becomes a paramount concern due to the data sharing using Internet among the end users and mobile devices. Mutual authentication of a mobile user and cloud service provider is necessary for accessing of any cloud services. However, resource constraint nature of mobile devices makes this task more challenging. In this paper, we propose a new secure and lightweight mobile user authentication scheme for mobile cloud computing, based on cryptographic hash, bitwise XOR, and fuzzy extractor functions. Through informal security analysis and rigorous formal security analysis using random oracle model, it has been demonstrated that the proposed scheme is secure against possible well-known passive and active attacks and also provides user anonymity. Moreover, we provide formal security verification through ProVerif 1.93 simulation for the proposed scheme. Also, we have done authentication proof of our proposed scheme using the BurrowsAbadi-Needham logic. Since the proposed scheme does not exploit any resource constrained cryptosystem, it has the lowest computation cost in compare to existing related schemes. Furthermore, the proposed scheme does not involve registration center in the authentication process, for which it is having lowest communication cost compared with existing related schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) provides cloud resources through on-demand basis by integrating cloud computing into mobile environment [1] , [2] . Nowadays, both in industry as well as academia, mobile cloud computing has drawn much attention. A recent analysis done by Heavy Reading estimates that, by the end of 2017, mobile cloud computing market will generate around 68 U.S. billion dollars of direct revenue [3] . Reports from different sources like ABI research [4] predict that, number of worldwide mobile cloud computing users have exploded rapidly, from 42.8 million users on 2008 to 998 million users in 2014 [2] .
IT organizations are now increasingly using various cloud computing softwares, infrastructures (like Gmail, Facebook etc.) and frameworks (like Google AppEngine, Amazon web service etc.). Cloud computing are getting popular to IT developers and users day by day. On the other side, worldwide deployment and development of various smartphone applications are also increasing exponentially. Rapid development and implementation of many IT services in mobile cloud computing necessitates extensive research on security issues [5] - [9] .
An architecture for distributed mobile cloud computing is represented in Fig. 1 . To access a mobile cloud computing service, a mobile user MU i requests the cloud service through an installed mobile App or web browser. After that a mutual authentication between MU i and the cloud service provider CS j is done by the user mobile App or web browser [10] . Both MU i and CS j need to go through a secure mutual authentication process that should support some basic requirements. These include computation efficiency, user anonymity, session key security etc. in order to prevent various threats over insecure channel.
Intrinsically, mobile cloud computing services are quite distributed and heterogeneous in nature. Thus, registering separately for each cloud service provider by maintaining respective user account is almost an impossible task. To be precise, MU i requires to access several cloud services from CS j with the help of single registered user account. But, traditional two-party single server authentication scheme cannot be directly applicable for a multiple mobile could servers environment. Single sign-on (SSO) scheme requires single credential and single registration for accessing multiple mobile could computing services [11] , [12] . Three separate parties, namely, mobile user, cloud service provider/cloud server and trusted identity provider (IdP) (registration center (RC) or smart card generator (SCG)) are involved in SSO mechanism. However, SSO authentication can be done both with involving IdP/SCG/RC [13] , [14] and without involving IdP/SCG/RC [15] , [16] .
Currently, many internet service providers and websites are using OpenId to implement distributed SSO techniques. In this case, both user and service provider need to register to IdP in advance. During login, mobile user sends the adopted OpenId to cloud service provider, which in turn redirects it to IdP for verification of user authenticity. This technique has two major issues. First, over involvement of IdP might turn into a bottleneck for the conventional SSO scheme. Second, OpenId scheme requires message communication through SSL network connection. Unfortunately, SSL based schemes need high computation costs as SSL technique is primarily based on public key cryptosystem like RSA [10] , [17] .
Wang and Wang [18] first attempted to explore the underlying rationales for preserving user privacy property in two-factor authentication schemes. They pointed out that without any public-key techniques, it is quite impossible to come up with a privacy-preserving scheme using only lightweight cryptographic primitives, such as one-way VOLUME 5, 2017 cryptographic hash functions. Wang and Wang [19] also presented some security failures of previous user authentication schemes. Three important suggestions were made by them [19] while analyzing those user authentication schemes: 1) user anonymity preservation with the help of public key techniques, 2) application of fuzzy-verifier to have trade-off between usability and security, and 3) privileged insider attack protection using salt values (i.e., random nonces). Wang et al. [20] suggested some evaluation metrics for designing anonymous two-factor user authentication and also pointed out how to make an acceptable tradeoff among usability, security and privacy. Huang et al. [21] also suggested that design of password-based authentication schemes using smart cards requires the importance to elaborate security models along with the formal security analysis. Huang et al. [22] also proposed a generic multi-factor authentication scheme that uses user password, smart-card and biometrics as three factors, and observed that a stand-alone authentication in which a user can be authenticated correctly, even if the connection to the remote server is down. Ma et al. [23] highlighted three principles for designing more robust user authentication schemes. Huang et al. [24] investigated a systematic approach for authenticating clients using three factors: 1) password, 2) smart card and 3) biometrics. They proposed a generic and secure model to upgrade a twofactor authentication scheme to a three-factor authentication scheme. It is interesting to observe that their conversion not only significantly improved the information assurance at low cost but also protected client privacy in distributed systems. Wang and Wang [25] presented a proposal of a new authentication scheme. It meets simplicity, practicability, and strong notions. In addition, they provided an adversary model and criteria set which can provide a benchmark for the evaluation of current and future two-factor authentication schemes. Moreover, Wang et al. [26] pointed out that there are at least seven different attacking scenarios and those attack scenarios may lead to the failure of an authentication scheme in arriving truly two-factor security. They also conducted a large-scale comparative evaluation of 26 representative two-factor schemes, and their results synopsis the request for better measurement when assessing new authentication schemes.
In a distributed mobile cloud computing environment, user mobile devices are quite resource constrained in nature and SSO technique does not provide a practical solution. Recently, Odelu et al. [27] , and Gope and Das [28] proposed secure authentication schemes for mobile cloud computing. Odelu et al. [27] exploits elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) point multiplication and asymmetric bilinear pairing operation for authentication and key establishment phase, while Gope-Das's scheme [28] is based on hash chain method. In Gope-Das's scheme [28] , a mobile subscriber is allowed to obtain the ubiquitous services only up to a specific time-period (say n-times), where the access duration strictly depends on the principle that the cloud user has paid for services. In this paper, we aim to design a novel secure and efficient scheme based on only lightweight computations, such as cryptographic hash function computation and bit wise XOR operation, while the biometric verification is done by the mobile user using the widely-used fuzzy extractor method.
In short, a mobile user authentication scheme for distributed mobile cloud computing environment should have the following properties: 1) A trusted third party (i.e., registration center (RC) or identity provider (IdP) or smart card generator (SCG)) should not be involved during user login process. However, during registration phase, both MU i and CS j should register to trusted third party only once. 2) A mobile user must avoid multiple credentials, such as identity and/or password for accessing different mobile cloud services.
3) The authentication process should avoid computationally costly operation in user mobile device. Also, storage requirement in user mobile should be less. 4) Mutual authentication between a mobile user and a cloud server CS j should use lightweight cryptographic operations.
A. MOTIVATION
The following basic motivating factors are behind the proposal of our scheme in this paper: 1) As user's mobile device generally operates through battery limited equipments, mobile user authentication mechanism should consume minimum possible computation, communication and storage costs. However, existing authentication schemes for mobile cloud computing environments, mostly based on resource consuming cryptosystems, such as bilinear pairing [10] , [29] and ECC [30] - [32] . This necessitates the design of an efficient mobile user authentication scheme that could avoid such cryptosystems without degrading overall security of the system. 2) A careful study on the existing authentication schemes under mobile cloud computing environment reveals most of those schemes have security flaws. Hence, design of more secure authentication scheme is needed in this domain. 3) Further, several schemes, such as the schemes of Shen et al. [31] , Yoon and Yoo [30] , and He and Wang [32] involve the RC or IdP or SCG in mobile user login process which results in more communication and computation costs.
B. THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we follow the widely-accepted Dolev-Yao threat model (DY model) [33] , which accepts the following basic assumptions:
• The messages are communicated over a public insecure channel.
• The pubic channel messages are susceptible to eavesdropping, deletion or modification, which are executed by adversary A.
• If, by any means, the adversary A obtains legal user's smart card or mobile device, he/she can execute power analysis attack and also extract all stored information from the device [34] .
C. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The following contributions are made in this paper:
1) The proposed scheme provides mobile user authentication in distributed mobile cloud computing environment, which supports secure key exchange, and user anonymity and untraceability properties. 2) Compared with the related existing authentication schemes proposed in the mobile cloud computing environment, the proposed scheme has the lowest computation and storage requirements. This is primarily due to usage of efficient one way cryptographic hash function, bitwise XOR operation and fuzzy extractor operation only. 3) No trusted third party, like IdP, SCG or RC, is involved in user login and authentication phases. This reduces overall communication and computation time of the proposed scheme. 4) The proposed scheme is lightweight in nature, and meanwhile, it also removes the security and functionality drawbacks of the earlier existing schemes. 5) The proposed scheme has the ability to resist various known attacks, which are evident through the rigorous formal security proof through random oracle model and BAN logic, the formal security verification using the ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool as well as through informal security analysis.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
Section II provides the mathematical preliminaries in brief, which are necessary to describe and analyze the proposed scheme. Section III presents the proposed mobile user authentication scheme for the distributed mobile cloud computing environment. Section IV provides the detailed formal and informal security analysis of the proposed scheme, while Section V presents formal security verification using ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool. Section VI presents the performance comparison of the proposed scheme with other related existing schemes. At last, Section VII provides the conclusion of the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
To design the proposed scheme, we use cryptographic hash function [35] , bitwise XOR operation and fuzzy extractor technique over biometrics input. This section presents a brief introduction about these basic mathematical preliminaries.
A. COLLISION-RESISTANT ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION
A one-way hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l receives a binary string of variable length, say x ∈ {0, 1} * and then produces a binary string H (x) ∈ {0, 1} l as an output of fixed length, say l bits. The hash function can be formally defined as follows [36] . [37] .
B. FUZZY EXTRACTOR AND BIOMETRICS
Nowadays, biometric keys are popularly used in various authentication process. The basic features and advantages of biometric keys can be found in [38] - [40] .
Fuzzy extractor is a technique that generates the same output string, even if the input biometric differs from recorded biometric sample upto a permissible error tolerance threshold limit. In general, a fuzzy extractor exploits two functions: 1) Generation(·) and 2) Reproduction(·), which are probabilistic and deterministic in nature, respectively.
Definition 2: Considering biometric key of length l bits generated from the given biometrics B and S = {0, 1} v being a metric space of finite dimensional biometric data points, the following functions are defined as follows.
• Generation: It takes B ∈ S as input and produces a pair (θ, φ), where θ ∈ {0, 1} l is the biometric key and φ is the public reproduction parameter.
• Reproduction: It recovers the original biometric key θ ∈ {0, 1} l on biometrics B provided that the Hamming distance between B and the original biometrics B at the time of registration by the same user is less than or equal to t, where t is a pre-defined error tolerance threshold parameter, that is, θ = Reproduction(B , φ). More discussion on fuzzy extractor method is available in [41] . Also, in recent years, the fuzzy extractor becomes popular as it is applied for biometric authentication purpose in several authentication protocols [41] - [44] .
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe various phases related to the proposed scheme.
The proposed scheme is based on the basic assumption that the distributed mobile cloud computing environment has three basic entities: 1) mobile users, 2) cloud server or cloud service provider, and 3) trusted registration center (RC). The system contains a set of m legal mobile users, M = {MU i |i = 1, 2, · · · , m}, a set of n cloud servers, VOLUME 5, 2017 The proposed scheme is composed of five phases, namely, 1) registration, 2) login, 3) authentication and key establishment, 4) password change, and 5) revocation of mobile device. The registration phase is composed of mobile user registration phase as well as cloud server registration phase. During the registration phase, the mobile users and cloud servers register to the RC independently. The RC generates the master secret keys randomly for the registered servers, and also generates mutual secret keys between respective mobile users and cloud servers. The login phase receives the user's credentials and verifies his/her authenticity. During the authentication phase, the mobile user and cloud server authenticate each other and mutually generate the secret shared session key. The password change phase gives the flexibility to MU i in order to locally update old password into new password at any time for security reasons.
The basic notations listed in Table 1 are used to design the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme makes use of the current system timestamps along with the random nonces to protect strong replay attacks. To achieve this goal, we assume that all the entities (mobile users, cloud service providers and the RC) in the network are synchronized with their clocks. This is a reasonable assumption as it is also applied in designing many authentication protocols proposed recently [27] , [41] - [46] .
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, both mobile users and cloud servers register to the registration center independently. This phase is composed of two sub-phases: 1. mobile user registration phase and 2. cloud server registration phase. Both the phases are executed only once and messages are communicated through secure channel (for example, in person).
1) MOBILE USER REGISTRATION PHASE
A mobile user MU i registers to the RC through the following steps:
1) MU i chooses his/her own identity ID i , password PW i , biometrics B i , two 128-bit random numbers b and k. 2) MU i produces (θ i , φ i ) = Generation(B i ) and computes the masked password 
In order to maintain user anonymity, instead of actual identity ID i , RC selects a unique and random temporary identity TID i for MU i . 5) The RC saves n server key-plus-id combinations
and delivers the mobile device to MU i securely.
RID ij s and RID S j s into his/her own mobile device, and deletes V ij s, TID i and RID S j s from the mobile device.
2) CLOUD SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
In order to register to the RC, a new cloud server must execute the following steps:
1) The cloud server (cloud service provider) CS j sends its identity ID S j to the RC through a secure channel.
2) The RC provides the master secret key X j to each CS j . 3) For all MU i s, the RC saves the credentials
Finally, the RC also saves pair (ID i , SN i ) in its own database, where SN i is the serial number of MU i 's mobile device. Figure 4 shows the fundamental steps of user and server registration phase. 
B. LOGIN PHASE
This phase describes how a legal mobile user MU i logins into the CS j . Fig. 5 shows the basic steps of login and authentication-key establishment phases. The following steps are essential to complete the login phase:
1) MU i inputs his/her identity ID i , password PW i and personal biometrics B i into his/her own mobile device. Using the fuzzy extractor reproduction procedure and
Moreover, using the stored parameter
is true or not. MU i proceeds to the next step only if this verification holds. 
3) MU i calculates
Using the mobile device parameter V ij , MU i also generates A ij = V ij ⊕ RPBW i . In addition, MU i selects an 128 bit random number RN i , generates the current timestamp TS i , and then computes 
into his/her own mobile device, and deletes V ij s and TID i from the mobile device. 7) All servers CS j s also update (ID i , TID i , r ij ) with (ID i , TID i , r ij ) in their databases after receiving the update request message securely from the RC.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section provides formal security analysis of the proposed scheme. Moreover, this section also puts forward discussion on how the proposed scheme resists various other security attacks.
A. FORMAL SECURITY USING ROR MODEL
The formal security of the proposed mobile user authentication protocol, say P, is done using the widely-accepted RealOr-Random (ROR) model [49] - [51] .
1) OUTLINE OF ROR MODEL
According to the ROR model, various queries, that simulate the real attack, are executed by an adversary A [52] , [53] . Table 2 contains various notations and brief descriptions of various oracle queries that are used in this proof. We assume that A interacts with P t , the t th instance of an executing participant (MU i or CS j ). Table 3 .
2) SECURITY PROOF
We use the notations listed in Table 3 for the formal security proof. Recent research has shown that user-chosen passwords (also termed as ''weak secrets'') follow the Zipf's law [55] , which is a vastly different distribution from the uniform distribution. Actually, the size |D| of password dictionary D is generally much constrained in the sense that the users will not use the whole space of passwords, but rather a small space of the allowed characters space [55] . On the other hand, even if we consider only trawling guessing attacks, actually the advantage of an adversary will be over 0.5 when q s = 10 7 or 10 8 [55] , [56] . When further considering targeted guessing attacks in which the adversary can make use of the target user's personal information, the advantage of the adversary will be over 0.5 when q s ≤ 10 6 [57] . Table 3 . Proof: We follow the similar proof as in [41] and [45] . The proof is composed of five games Gm i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). In a game Gm i , an adversary A tries to guess a correct bit b through the Test query. This event is defined as S i and the corresponding probability is denoted by Pr[S i ].
• Game Gm 0 : The initial game Gm 0 is considered to be identical with the actual protocol executing under the ROR model. Hence, we have,
• Game Gm 1 : This game considers simulation of Send, Test, Execute, Reveal, and Corrupt queries with respect to the proposed scheme. transcript Msg 2 ∈ L T , we obtain q s 2 lr as the collision probability. As a whole, we obtain,
• Game Gm 4 : In game Gm 4 , by exploiting Corrupt query, the adversary A tries to guess user's private credentials like password and biometric in online as well as offline modes. The guessing of biometric has maximum probability up to max{q s ( [45] , and that for password is C · q s s [55] . Since the games Gm 3 and Gm 4 are identical when these guessing attacks are absent, we have,
After executing all the games, A is only left in guessing the correct bit b. It is then clear that
Applying the law of triangular inequality, we have,
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Multiplying both sides of Equation (8) by a factor of 2 and then rearranging the terms, we finally obtain
Hence, the theorem is proved.
B. AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
BAN logic is used to mutual authentication between two communicating parties in a network [58] . Using the broadlyused BAN logic, we show that the proposed scheme achieves authentication goals discussed below. The basic BAN logic notations and their meanings are tabulated in Table 5 .
The main logical postulates of the BAN logic are defined by a set of laws (rules) as listed below [58] , [59] .
• Law 1 (Message Meaning Law (MML)).
• Law 2 (Nonce Verification Law (NVL)).
Q|≡#(S),Q|≡R| S Q|≡R|≡S
.
• Law 3 (Freshness Conjuncatenation Law (FCL)).
Q|≡#(S) Q|≡#(S,T ) .
• Law 4 (Jurisdiction Law (JL)).
Q|≡R⇒S,Q|≡R|≡S Q|≡S
• Law 5 (Additional Laws (AL)).
Q|≡ (S,T )
Q|≡S ,
Q (S,T )
Q S ,
Q|≡R (S,T )
Q|≡R S . To complete the authentication proof, the proposed scheme must meet the following two goals:
The generic types of the messages in the proposed scheme are given below. According to the message 1, we obtain,
• S 2 : According to the law AL, we obtain, CS j ID i , r ij ,
• S 3 : According to A.4 and MML, we obtain, CS j |≡
• S 4 : According to A.2 and FCL, we get,
• S 5 : According to NVL, we have,
• S 6 : Using A.6 and JL, we get,
• S 7 : From S 6 and AL, we obtain, CS j |≡ RN i , CS j |≡ TS i , CS j |≡ ID i .
• S 8 : According to A.11, A.12, A.13, we get, CS j |≡ ID S j , CS j |≡ TS j and CS j |≡ RN j .
• S 9 : Since SK CS j ,MU i = H (ID i ||ID S j ||B ji ||M 1 ||RN j ||TS i ||TS j ) and the results in Steps S 7 and S 8 give
(Goal 2)
• S 10 : Using the message 2 and AL, we obtain, MU i RN j , TS j X j .
• S 11 : According to A.3 and MML, we get, MU i |≡ CS j | (RN j , TS j ).
• S 12 : Using A.1 and FCL, we obtain, MU i |≡ #(RN j , TS j ).
• S 13 : Using NVL, we obtain, MU i |≡ CS j |≡ (RN j , TS j ).
• S 14 : A. ←→ CS j ).
(Goal 1) As a result, Goal 1 and Goal 2 ensure that both MU i and CS j mutually authenticate each other.
C. DISCUSSION ON OTHER ATTACKS
This section also informally analyzes the security of the proposed scheme to show that it can defend the following other known attacks.
1) REPLAY ATTACK
According to the proposed scheme, the login and authentication phases require two message communications. In login phase, MU i sends 
matches with the stored RN i in its database corresponding to ID i . If it is present, Msg 1 is treated as a replay message. As a whole, the proposed scheme protects strong replay attack because both the current timestamp and random nonce are applied.
2) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
An adversary A may try to launch man-in-the-middle attack in order to set up a third party independent connection with both MU i and CS j for a particular session. Moreover, A might intend to modify public message parameters to invalidate a login request of a legal user. The proposed scheme uses hash function, random nonce and bitwise XOR operation in both message MSg 1 and Msg 2 . However, A can not modify any message as these need the credentials, such as A ij , ID S j , V ij and RID ij . This causes the proposed scheme to resist the manin-the-middle attack.
3) STOLEN/LOST MOBILE DEVICE ATTACK
The user mobile device contains ||θ i ||b) ). Since r ij and b are random numbers and H (·) is a collision-resistant, it is computationally infeasible problem to obtain ID i , PW i and θ i from V ij and A ij in polynomial time. Hence, the proposed scheme resists this attack.
4) OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
According to user registration phase described in Section III-A.1, mobile device of
As discussed in Section IV-C.3, A can not guess password from any stored parameters like D 1 i , D 2 i and V ij as PW i is masked with θ i and random secret b. To obtain PW i , A needs to guess these parameters simultaneously, which have negligible probability. So, this kind of attack is resisted by the proposed scheme.
5) FORWARD SECRECY
Forward secrecy (also known as known key secrecy) ensures that a compromised session key does not help an adversary to compute past session keys. According to the proposed scheme, the session key is mutually computed as
Due to the use of RN i , TS i , RN j , and TS j , for every new login session, SK MU i ,CS j (= SK CS j ,MU i is generated in random but in a unique way. As a consequence, compromise of the current session key provides no crucial information to the adversary that helps him/her to compute previous session keys.
6) ANONYMITY AND UNTRACEABILITY
Generally, the mobile users intend to access cloud services in an anonymous way. As defined in the threat model in Section I-B, A is able to eavesdrop public messages transmitted between MU i and CS j . During login time, MU i sends
Note that MU i does not send the original identity in login message. Rather, it sends the temporary identity TID i embedded in
As hash function H (·) is considered to be collision resistant, from these eavesdropped messages, it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to compute ID i . Thus, the proposed scheme provides user anonymity property.
The messages Msg 1 = {TID * i , C 1 , H 1 , TS i } and Msg 2 = {C 2 , H 3 , TS j } are unique and dynamic in nature in each session, because each component in these messages use either timestamp or random nonce. Hence, the proposed scheme also preserves the untraceability property as an attacker can not trace the same user in different session. 
7) SESSION KEY SECURITY
According to the proposed scheme, both MU i and CS j mutually establish a common session key SK MU i ,CS j (= SK CS j ,MU i ) for future communication. Note that the session key is calculated as 
= H (ID
To establish the session key, both MU i and CS j mutually authenticate each other. Furthermore, to derive the session key an attacker need to have the credentials ID i , ID S j , A ij (= B ji ). Hence, the session key is secure.
8) PARALLEL SESSION AND REFLECTION ATTACKS
An adversary A can masquerade as a genuine user and then try to initiate a new parallel session with CS j if the credentials belonging to a legal user are obtained. On the other side, as already explained in Sections IV-C.1, IV-C.2 and IV-C.5, A can not obtain mobile user credentials through offline guessing attack or with any eavesdropped messages. As a result, the proposed scheme resists parallel session as well as reflection attacks.
9) EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE ATTACK
Under this attack, the exposer of ephemeral (temporary) secrets (e.g., random numbers) of a session may harm the secrecy of a session key. After execution of the protocol, if the random numbers are not properly deleted, an adversary A might obtain them from a compromised device and also can launch ephemeral secret leakage attack. An authentication protocol must be able to resist this attack.
In the proposed scheme, the session key is computed as
, r ij is an 1024-bit random secret and X j is the master secret key of the cloud server CS j . Hence, even if the values of random numbers RN i and RN j (that is, M 2 ) are known, the adversary A cannot compute SK MU i ,CS j as it also depends on the long-term secret credentials, such as ID i , ID S j and A ij . As a result, SK MU i ,CS j can not derive other session keys established in other sessions between MU i and CS j using the ephemeral secret leakage attack.
10) USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Using user impersonation attack, an adversary A can masquerade as a legitimate user and try to login to CS j . However, the proposed scheme can resist this attack due to the following argument. A needs to input correct inputs ID i , PW i and B i to prove its authenticity as a genuine user. As already discussed, an adversary has no computationally feasible way to guess these parameters.
A can also try to generate a replay login message Msg 1 = {TID * i , C 1 , H 1 , TS i } and submit it to CS j . But as explained in the replay attack protection, a duplicate value of the timestamp TS i or random number RN i will reveal that the message is a replayed one and it is not an original message. Note that
As A does not know ID i , PW i and B i , he/she is unable to guess correct value of A ij and can not modify Msg 1 . Hence, the proposed scheme resists user impersonation attack. 
11) SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
The proposed scheme protects server impersonation attack where an adversary A can masquerade as a cloud server and try to respond with valid message to MU i . When CS j receives the user login message, it replies with an authorization message Msg 2 = {C 2 , H 3 , TS j }. This message contains the hash value
as it requires the server secret key X j and random number r ij . As a consequence, the proposed scheme also resists server impersonation attack.
12) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
In this attack, we assume that the registration information ID i , (RPWB i ⊕ k) from the mobile user registration request message is known to a privileged-insider user of the RC, who acts an adversary A. Later, after completing the mobile user registration process, it is also assumed that A also attains the stolen/lost mobile device, and then extract the information stored in the device using the power analysis attack [34] . As discussed in Section IV-C.3, it is computationally difficult task for A to obtain PW i and the biometric key θ i VOLUME 5, 2017 from V ij and A ij in polynomial time. Furthermore, without having the random secret k, A can not compute RPWB i from RPWB i ⊕ k. Therefore, A can not also obtain PW i and θ i from RPWB i . Hence, the proposed scheme is free from the privileged-insider attack.
V. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING PROVERIF
The formal security verification of the proposed scheme is presented in this section using the applied pi calculus based ProVerif simulation tool [60] . This tool can be practically used for testing whether an attacker is able to attack (or compromise) the session key in a security protocol.
In Fig. 7 , we provide the code for declaration of channels, free variables, constants, functions, equations, queries and events required for the proposed scheme. The code for the process of the mobile user in the registration, login and authentication phases is modeled in Fig. 8 . The process of the cloud sever CS j is modeled as parallel composition of the process of registration (SReg) and process of authentication (SAuth). Fig. 9 shows the program code for the processes related to CS j .
Finally, we execute the codes of the previous three tables in ProVerif latest version (i.e., ProVerif 1.93). The complete obtained results of session key secrecy (from both user and server side) and authentication are shown in Fig. 10 . The result shows the following observatios:
• RESULT inj-event(UserAuth(id)) ==> inj-event (UserStart(id)) is true.
• RESULT not attacker(SKus[]) is true.
• RESULT not attacker(SKus[]) is true. Hence, the proposed scheme passes the security verification.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the security and functionality of the proposed scheme with the recently developed multiserver authentication schemes designed for mobile cloud computing services [10] , [29] - [32] . A detailed comparison on different security attacks is shown in Table 6 . It is seen that a large number of the recent schemes suffer from denial of service attack and stolen mobile device attack. Further, most of the existing schemes fail to provide efficiency in login phase and password change phase, and they do not provide revocation of lost mobile device phase. It is clear from Table 6 that the proposed scheme overcomes such security and functionality weaknesses of the existing schemes.
As implemented by Scott et al. [61] and Tseng et al. [29] , we have considered Philips HiPersmart card device and Pentium IV computer for user side and cloud server side computation, respectively. Philips HiPersmart card has a clock speed of 36MHz with 32-bit RISC MIPS processor. It has flash memory of 256 KB with 16KB RAM. On the other side, Pentium IV has maximum clock speed of 3GHz operating under Windows XP OS with 512 MB RAM [16] . Bilinear pairing and other cryptographic operations are implemented in C language under specific IDE and specific C/C++ Library (MIRACL). Table 7 shows the notations for different cryptographic operations along with their execution time in Philips HiPersmart card device and Pentium IV computer, respectively.
In Table 8 , we tabulate and compare the computation overhead of the proposed scheme with the relevant schemes [10] , [29] - [32] . For all the given schemes, we separately tabulated computation for MU i and cloud service provider CS j under Philips HiPersmart card device and Pentium IV computer, respectively. Also, we mention the underlying cryptographic operations for each relevant scheme in comparison. We study that the total user side computation overhead of the proposed scheme in login and authentication phases is 9 * T H + 8 * T X + T FE . Considering the execution time needed for XOR operation is negligible, the total execution time of MU i is then approximately (9 * 1 + 130) = 139 ms. On the other hand, the cloud service provider CS j has a computation overhead of 7 * T H + 7 * T X . Hence, total execution time in Pentium IV server is less than 7 * 0.01 = 0.07 ms.
Comparison on communication cost of the proposed scheme with related mobile user authentication schemes [10] , [29] - [32] is also tabulated in Table 9 . Since the user and server registration phases, password change phase and lost mobile device revocation phase are executed only once, we consider only login and authentication phases for calculation of communication cost for the proposed scheme and other schemes. The proposed scheme needs two messages Msg 1 = {TID * i , C 1 , H 1 , TS i } and Msg 2 = {C 2 , H 3 , TS j }, which require (160 + 160 + 32 + 160) = 512 bits and (160 + 32 + 160) = 352 bits, respectively. So, the overall communication cost of the proposed scheme is (512 + 352) = 864 bits. Note that the proposed scheme does not involve RC during login and authentication phases, which causes significant reduction of overall communication cost. In addition, the proposed scheme requires only two rounds of message communication, whereas other related schemes require five, four or three rounds of message communication. It is observed from Table 8 that the user mobile device in HeWang's scheme [32] and Yoon-Yoo's scheme [30] takes ≈ 397 ms and ≈ 265 ms, respectively. Shen et al.'s scheme [31] and Tsai-Lo's scheme [10] take ≈ 395 ms and ≈ 393 ms, respectively. Reason behind the high computation cost in the existing schemes is that they either use ECC based cryptosystem or bilinear pairing based cryptosystem. Quite clearly the user side computation cost of the proposed scheme is much less than that for these schemes. As a result, the proposed scheme comparatively more suited for the mobile users with low-power computing devices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Before providing any access of cloud service to a mobile user, mutual authentication of a mobile user and cloud service provider is necessary. Authentication scheme should be lightweight with respect to resource constrained user mobile device. In this paper, we have proposed a mobile user authentication scheme on mobile cloud computing, which is based on cryptographic hash, bitwise XOR and fuzzy extractor functions only. We have provided the formal security proof through the ROR model and also the formal security verification through the ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool. Moreover, mutual authentication proof is provided by the BAN logic. Since the proposed scheme does not exploit any resource constrained cryptosystem, it has the low computation cost as compared to that for the existing related schemes. As the proposed scheme does not involve the RC in the authentication process, it has also low communication cost as compared to that for the existing related schemes. Overall, high security and low communication and computation costs make the proposed scheme very suitable for the practical applications in the mobile cloud computing domain. 
